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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DO FIRMS MANAGE EARNINGS DURING SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS: THE 
CASE OF AUSTRALIA 
By  
Xingzheng Xiao  
 
I examine earnings management around seasoned equity offerings in Australian Listed firms 
from 2002 to 2008. Seasoned equity issuers can raise reported earnings by altering discretionary 
accounting accruals. Consistent with prior studies (for example ,  Rangan, 1998 ;  Lakshmanan, 
2000;  Yoon and Miller, 2002; Jo, Kim and Park, 2007; Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010; among 
many others ), I find that firms in Australia do manage their earnings in the year prior to 
seasoned equity offerings and the year of seasoned equity offerings, however, depending on 
different industries, some firms manage their earnings in the year prior to seasoned equity 
offering, for example, firms from industrials, consumer staples, health care and IT industry while 
other firms manage their earnings in the year of seasoned equity offering, for example,  firms 
from the materials, industrials, consumer discretionary and consumer staples industry.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Existing studies have examined earnings management around firm-specific events: for example, 
Teoh et al (1998) find that issuers have unusually high income-increasing accounting 
adjustments pre-issue; Lakshmanan (2000) provides evidence which consistent with earnings 
management, that is, net income and accruals are abnormally high around seasoned equity 
offerings. The aim of this study is to investigate whether there is evidence of Australian firms 
managing their earnings one year before and during the year of seasoned equity offerings. 
 
Failures of Australian corporations such as Harris Scarfe, HIH Insurance, OneTel and Ansett 
Airlines caused financial as well as social disaster to Australians. In each case, accounting 
numbers were implicated as playing a supportive role in facilitating such failures. It is against 
that background that makes this study particularly significant as it can highlight whether 
managers manage firms’ earnings to attain a specific goal. It is reasonable to anticipate that firms 
will manage earnings upwards in order to make the market for shares value their shares higher 
than what it actually is. Prior research confirms this logic (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998a, 
1998b; Teoh et al. 1998c). This study also anticipates this finding to be true in an Australian 
setting in the one year leading to and the current year of new equity offerings. The result from 
this study has policy implications for accounting regulators and investors.  
 
Prior research has studied earnings management using discretionary accruals as its proxy 
(Defond and Jiambalvo 1994; Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005; Rees et al. 1996; Teoh et al. 
1998a; Defond and Park 1997; Subramanyan 1996)).  This study will do likewise and examine 
earnings management relating to firm specific events, namely seasoned equity offering in 
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Australia. My results were documented by industry group. Using a final sample of 4817 firm-
year observations attained from Aspect Data from 2002 to 2008, I find that there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that firms in the materials, industry, consumer discretionary and consumer 
staples industry in the current year of new share offerings manage their earnings. There is not 
enough evidence to conclude the same for firms in the energy, health care, IT and telecom 
industry. In the one year before new share offerings, there is enough evidence to suggest that 
firms from industry, consumer staples, health care and IT industry manage their earnings 
whereas the same cannot be said of firms from the energy, materials, consumer discretionary and 
telecom industry.  For the aggregate effect of earnings management prior and in the year of new 
equity issuing, firms in materials, industrials, consumer staples and IT manage earnings upward , 
which is not only statistically but also economically significant.  
 
In order to have a better understanding of the relationship between share issuing and earnings 
management, I further conduct two sensitivity tests: (1)   partition the sample into large and 
small firms at the median firm size level; (2) excluding loss firms. I find that earnings 
management a year prior to share issuing is positively and significantly associated with new 
public share offering of firms from the health care and IT industry for larger firms. The same is 
observed for firms in the industrials, consumer staples and IT industry for smaller firms. In the 
year of new public share offerings I find that earnings management is significant in large firms 
from materials, industrials and IT industry. The same conclusion is found in smaller firms in the 
consumer discretionary industry. I also find earnings management for profit firms in the year 
prior to the equity offering for firms from energy, materials, industrials, and IT, and in the year 
of the equity offering for firms from consumers, health care, and telecommunications. In addition, 
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the aggregate earnings management prior and in the year of seasoned equity issue shows that 
large firms are less likely to manage their earnings than smaller firms. Choi and Sohn (2010) find 
that banks with higher disclosure levels tend to do less discretionary accounting practices in loan 
loss provisions, so the reason that large firms are less likely to manage their earnings might be 
because they have  higher disclosure levels. The aggregate results also show that profit firms 
manage earnings more upward than the whole population of all firms, which might because 
profit firms have more sales, so that they can use the discretional accruals to manage their 
earnings. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Prior studies have documented that management tend to overstate their earnings in the year of 
issuing new equity. Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998) are early researchers who examine 
whether firms manipulate earnings during public equity offerings and whether the accounting 
and stock market consequences are associated with earnings management. Teoh et al (1998) 
document a sample of 1265 firms conducting equity offerings from 1976 to 1989 and find that 
equity issuers manipulate earnings upwards around equity offerings through adjusting 
discretionary accruals. Additionally, they find that those issuers who participate in earnings 
management prior to the offerings have lower long-term abnormal stock returns and net income 
post to the issuance.  
 
Rangan (1998) reports similar results with Teoh et al (1998). Positive abnormal accruals for 
equity issuing firms are significant higher during the year around the public equity offerings, and 
these accruals result in a decline in operating performance and stock returns in the post issuing 
period. He explains that the stock market fails to detect the earnings management and temporally 
overvalues equity issuing firms. But both Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998) report that such 
accrual manipulation will lead to earnings reversals and market disappointment in the following 
period after equity issuing.  
 
Consistent with Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998), Lakshmanan (2000) also finds significant 
positive abnormal accruals around public equity offerings. However, the major counter argument 
is that he perceives that earnings management behaviour is a reflection of equity issuers' 
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response to market anticipation at offering announcement rather than intentionally to mislead 
investors. He argues that stock market does not react to earnings management inefficiently and 
Teoh et al's and Rangan's findings of abnormal market returns are misspecified.    
 
Yoon and Miller (2002) also find evidence consistent with the argument that issuers widely 
employ income-increasing strategies during the time of equity offerings in the Korean context. 
The results are particularly robust for issuing firms where financial performances are relatively 
poor. Similar with Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998), they also find that equity issuers 
continuously manipulate earnings upwards in the year of equity offerings. The association tests 
between abnormal return and earnings management also indicate that the market misinterprets 
the implications of discretionary accruals. Using 3,099 U.S. SEOs offers between 1989 and 2000, 
Kim and Park (2005) provide evidence that equity issuers boost their earnings before an 
offerings and push the offer prices up to increase offering proceeds.  
 
Jo, Kim and Park (2007) use a sample of seasoned equity offerings to study the association 
between the choice of financial intermediary and earnings management and find an inverse 
association between underwriter quality and issuers’ earning management, that is, highly 
prestigious underwriters restrict firms’ incentives for earnings management to protect their 
reputation while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring 
by choosing low-quality underwriters.  Using the modified Jones model to measure discretionary 
current accruals, Lim, Thong and Ding (2008) examines whether firm diversification affect 
earnings management in seasoned equity offerings. They find a positive relation between firms’ 
diversification and the degree of earnings management.  
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Guthrie and Sokolowsky (2010)  examine whether the degree of shareholder concentration affect 
firms’ earnings management in seasoned equity offerings and find that firms inflate earnings 
around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider block holdings, but not in their 
absence. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) extend previous empirical studies and reveal that equity 
issuing firms utilise not only accrual-based earnings but also real earnings management activities 
to increase income around equity offerings. Their analysis shows that post-SEO operating 
underperformance is driven by accrual reversals as well as real operational decisions to 
manipulate earnings. Moreover, the real activities management is more severe than accrual-based 
manipulation to explain the post-SEO performance.   
 
Previous studies agree that equity issuers use income-increasing techniques around the public 
equity offerings. Most of studies point that discretionary accruals peak in the year prior to equity 
offerings and even in the year of offerings. Although a few of studies examine the earnings 
management techniques beyond accrual-based management (e.g. Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), 
discretionary accruals are still one of most commonly employed proxies in prior earnings 
management literature. Compared with other accounting techniques to manipulate earnings such 
as changing accounting methods, the cost of accrual manipulation is less costly via shifting 
earnings between periods (Healy, 1985). This study also employs discretionary accruals as 
earnings management proxies.         
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III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Firms with new equity issuing engage in earnings management either to inflate stock price 
because of opportunism (Teoh et al, 1998 and Rangan, 1998) or rationally respond to meet 
investors’ earnings expectations (Lakshmanan, 2000). Teoh et al (1998) and Rangan (1998), in 
the perspective of opportunism, argue that firms can raise capital at more favourable terms than 
if earnings were not managed so that issuers can enjoy a significant share price increase and 
receive more cash infusion through equity offerings. The incentive to inflate share price is 
particularly strong for managers with their compensation based on stock price. Lakshmanan 
(2000) questions the argument of managerial opportunism and provide alternative explanations 
that earnings management before equity offerings is due to managerial rational response to meet 
market expectations. He argues that equity issuers cannot effectively signal their financial report 
in absence of earnings manipulation, and investors perceive that all firms with public offerings 
have overstated prior earnings, and thereby revise downwards their expectations of stock prices. 
Additional evidence in support of Lakshmanan's managerial rational response hypothesis finds 
significantly higher abnormal returns for firms exceeding market expectations (Bartov, Givoly, 
and Hayn, 2002) and negative share returns for firms failing to satisfy market expectations 
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Skinner et al (2002) further report that the penalty for firms failing to 
meet expectations is particularly stronger than the reward for firms that exceed them. 
Furthermore, existing shareholders might also support managerial income-increasing actions 
through capital raising activities because an associated share price increase can maximise their 
personal wealth. Consequently, managers have strong incentives to meet earnings expectations 
and inflate stock price through public equity offerings, in anticipation of new equity offerings. 
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Prior literature has demonstrated that discretionary accruals are widely and less costly used 
techniques to achieve income-increasing manipulation (Teoh et al, 1998 and Rangan, 1998; 
Lakshmanan, 2000). As a result, I hypothesize, in the alternative form,              
 
H1:  Discretionary accruals tend to increase in the year before the equity issuance.  
However, current earnings management will suffer future earnings reversals, which will decrease 
market expectations and lead to negative abnormal returns in the future period. Empirical studies 
addressing issue also find that managers continuously manipulate earnings even in the year of 
new equity offerings to avoid an immediate earnings decline (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al, 1998; 
Lakshmanan, 2000). That is because an immediate earnings reversal after the new equity 
offering will lead to market disappointment, and the associated price decline might damage the 
managers' reputation and potentially precipitate legal actions against the firm and its managers. 
Therefore, I hypothesize, in the alternative form,          
 
H2:  Discretionary accruals tend to increase in the year of  the equity issuance.   
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Estimating discretionary accruals  
 
Accruals have the desirable trait of providing a summary of a firm’s accounting choice, which 
are divided into a discretionary and non-discretionary component. Following previous studies, 
the discretionary component is used as the proxies of managerial discretion in reported earnings 
(Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al, 1998; Lakshmanan, 2000). As discretionary accruals cannot be 
observed directly from the financial statements, they have to be estimated using some model. 
Early work on earnings management assumes that the non-discretionary component of accruals 
is constant which is relaxed in Jones (1991). She estimates that non-discretionary accruals with 
an OLS regression with changes in sales, and the level of property, plant and equipment as 
explanatory variables. Her model attempts to control for the effect of changing economic 
conditions by employing total assets as a deflator. The discretionary accruals are measured as the 
difference between actual total accruals and predicted non discretionary accruals which are 
reflected in the fixed  values of the following model. The Jones model for discretionary accruals 
( ) in the event year t is, 
   
Where 
 = total accruals in year t 
 = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
 = gross property plant and equipment in year t; 
 = total assets at t-1  
 = Firm-specific parameters. 
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Jones model assumes implicitly that discretion cannot be exercised over revenues and thereby 
extracts discretionary component of accruals, resulting in the estimation of earnings management 
to be biased toward zero (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 1995). Dechow at al (1995) modify 
original Jones model that the change in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the 
estimation period. The modification is designed to eliminate the error of Jones model when 
discretion is exercised over revenues. As it is easier to manage earnings by adjusting credit sales 
than cash sales, this modified Jones model assumes that all changes in credit sales in the 
estimation period is due to earnings management.  
 
Following Dechow et al's (1995) arguments that firms having experienced unusual performance 
are expected to have systematically non-zeroaccruals and firms’ performance is correlated with 
accruals, Kothari et al (2005) examine two ways to control performance in estimating 
discretionary accruals: (1) including a performance variable such as returns on assets (ROA); (2) 
calculating performance-matched discretionary accruals. Under this method, for firms from the 
same two-digit SIC code, they match the treatment firm with the control firm which has the 
closest ROA in the current year or the prior year and then subtracting the control firm’s 
discretionary accruals from the treatment firm’s discretionary accruals. Kothari et al (2005) find 
that discretionary accruals model which control performance is superior to previous Jones and 
modified Jones model. 
 
This study uses the modified Jones (1991) model developed in Dechow et al (1995) and refined 
in Kothari et al (2005) to detect discretionary accruals. The model estimations include a constant 
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term as Kothari et al (2005) find that including a constant term (ROA) controls for 
heteroscedasticity not alleviated by using assets as deflator and mitigates problem of an omitted 
size variable, both of which make power of test comparisons more robust. The total accruals are 
estimated as the difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash from 
operations. The discretionary accruals, reflected in the residuals of the regression, are measured 
as the difference between total actual accruals and predicted non-discretionary accruals.  
 
 
Where 
 = returns on assets in year t 
 
4.2 Sampling  
 
Firm’s accounting data is obtained from the Aspect Data base from 2002 through 2008, and 
firm’s stock return data is obtained from Australian Securities Exchange Database.  The sample 
starts in 2002 because the Australian Corporations Act, which gives clear guidance on director’ 
responsibility for their company, is implemented in 2001. The sample ends in 2008 in order to 
avoid the effect of global financial crisis on stock price.  
Aspect provides 7505 firm–years observations without missing value. I merge Market to Book 
ratio to the accounting data.  Due to missing value of Market to Book ratio, the sample size 
reduces to 6640 firm-years. To check for obvious data errors and document any cases excluded 
because of data error, I calculate the descriptive statistics (table1) for all of the variables. 
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Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics for all variables (in hundred million except N and 
all statistics for Market to Book Ratio) 
VARIABLE     N mean median SD min max 
TOTAL              ASSET     6640 10.79 0.49 62.95 0 1670 
OPERATING REVENUE 
  
6640 7.67 0.33 48.69 -0.03 1620 
NET RECEIVABLES 
  
6640 0.87 0.04 4.59 0 125 
OPERATING  PROFIT AFTER TA 
 
6640 0.7 0.01 6.8 -116 206 
NET CASH FLOW FROM OPERATI 
 
6640 1.07 0.02 8.1 -21.4 217 
PPE 
   
6640 3.88 0.05 25.92 -0.01 520 
TOTAL LIBILITIES 
  
6640 6.07 0.2 38.7 0 1200 
MARKET TO BOOK RATIO   6640 2.82 1.68 10.34 -314.7 266 
 
Table 1 demonstrates some data error, for example, negative value in operating revenue 
(minimum value is -3002639), negative value in net receivable (minimum value is -8623), and 
negative value in Plant, Property and Equipment (minimum value is -517000). I  exclude firms 
with negative value in operating revenue, net receivable, and PPE, which reduces the sample size 
to 6632 firm-years , among them, 5754 firm-years are for 2002 to 2008, and 4817 firm-years for 
energy (GICS 10) , materials – metals & mining  only (GICS 151040) ,  industrials  (GICS 20) ,  
consumer discretionary (GICS 25) , consumer staples (GICS 30) , health care (GICS 35) , 
information technology (GICS 45) , and telecommunications (GICS 50) industries. 
4.3 Summary Statistic of Discretional accruals  
 
I estimate annual cross–sectional regressions on the sample partitioned by GICS 4-digit  industry 
code and year and collect the residuals from each regression. I then calculate the mean of those 
residuals according to the 4-digit level to examine the discretional accruals of each industry 
group.  The results are provided in table 2 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Unstandardised Residuals  
Industry  GICS N MEAN MEDIAN SD MIN MAX 
Energy  1010 473 0 0.029 0.466 -5.618 3.165 
Materials 1510 754 0 0.006 0.35 -4.761 2.762 
 
2010 526 0 -0.022 0.204 -0.71 1.802 
Industrials 2020 318 0 0.002 0.138 -0.795 0.828 
 
2030 116 0 -0.004 0.044 -0.1 0.145 
Consumer 2510 65 0 0 0.077 -0.228 0.288 
Discretionary 2520 140 0 -0.001 0.086 -0.327 0.467 
 
2530 253 0 0.007 0.104 -0.347 0.519 
 
2540 264 0 0.009 0.217 -2.05 0.99 
 
2550 231 0 0.009 0.094 -0.412 0.255 
Consumer 3010 51 0 -0.001 0.071 -0.238 0.16 
Staples 3020 248 0 -0.011 0.089 -0.337 0.399 
 
3030 1 
     
Health 3510 333 0 0.006 0.312 -1.637 2.368 
Care 3520 256 0 -0.006 0.197 -0.921 0.919 
Information  4510 428 0 -0.016 0.34 -2.968 1.251 
Technology 4520 184 0 0.002 0.287 -0.889 1.09 
 
4530 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Telecom 5010 169 0 0.022 0.331 -1.746 1.631 
 
 
Table 2 shows that while the means of the discretional accruals are all close to zero, there is a 
significant difference for the medians, ranging from -0.0027 for GICS 2510 to 0.029 for 
GICS1010, which shows that for some GICS group, the unstandardised residuals may not be 
normal distributed. Due to the few observations for GICS 3030 (only 1) and GICS4530 (only 7), 
I will not consider these groups in future discussion. 
4.4 Test the assumptions underpinning the residuals of OLS regression  
 
Tests for normality of the residuals  
 One of the assumptions of OLS regression is that the residuals are normally distributed with 
expected value of zero.  To test this assumption,  I produce the yearly histograms (Appendix 1) 
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for each industry group and test the normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, Cramer-
von Mises test and Anderson-Darling test (Appendix 2). Assuming a 5% significant level, table 3 
provides the results of the normality test. 
Table 3:  Results for the normality tests of the residuals. 
Industry  GICS Year2003 Year2004 Year2005 Year2006 Year2007 Year2008 
Energy  1010 YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Materials 1510 NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 
2010 NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Industrials 2020 YES NO NO NO NO NO 
 
2030 YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Consumer 2510 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Discretionary 2520 YES YES YES NO YES YES 
 
2530 NO NO YES YES YES YES 
 
2540 NO NO NO NO YES NO 
 
2550 NO NO YES YES YES NO 
Consumer 3010 NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Staples 3020 YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Health 3510 YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Care 3520 YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Information  4510 NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Technology 4520 YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Telecom 5010 YES NO YES NO NO NO 
        Notes: "Yes" means the residuals are normally distributed, while "NO" means the residuals are not  normally 
distributed. 
     Table 3 show that among the 102 distributions, only 43 (42.16%) are normally distributed. 
Moreover the normality clusters in some industries, for example, for GICS2510, the residuals are 
all normal distributed for the five years , for GICS2520, GICS3010, GICS4520, four out of five 
residuals exhibits normal distribution, while on the other hand,  for  GICS 1510, GICS 2010 , 
GICS 4510, none of the residuals are normal distributed, for GICS2020, GICS2540, GICS3510, 
the residuals are normal distributed only in one out of six years. For other GICS groups, the 
results are mixed. 
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Tests for Heteroscedasticity 
Another main assumption for the OLS regression is the homogeneity of variance of the residuals. 
I use the White test to examine the null hypothesis that the variance of the residual is 
homogenous. In most of the case, the results on “Test of First and Second Moment 
Specification” show relative high p value, demonstrating that the residuals have constant 
variance.  
 
4.5 Tests for normality after excluding outliers 
 
To test whether the non-normal distribution are caused by some outliers, I exclude the sample 
whose residuals from the initial regressions are more than 3 standard deviations from zero, 
residuals with “Cook’s distance’ equal or larger than 3.0, firms whose total accrual divided by 
total assets are larger than one, and firms revenue divided by total assets are less than 1 percent.  
This reduces the sample size to 4461 firm-years.  I then conduct the normality tests, with the 
results provided in table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
１６ 
 
Table 4: Results for the normality tests of the residuals after excluding the outliers 
Industry  GICS Year2003 Year2004 Year2005 Year2006 Year2007 Year2008 
Energy  1010 YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Materials 1510 NO NO NO YES NO NO 
 
2010 NO YES NO YES NO NO 
Industrials 2020 YES NO YES YES YES N0 
 
2030 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Consumer 2510 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Discretionary 2520 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
2530 NO YES YES YES YES YES 
 
2540 NO NO NO NO YES NO 
 
2550 NO YES YES YES YES NO 
Consumer 3010 NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Staples 3020 YES YES YES NO YES NO 
Health 3510 YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Care 3520 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Information  4510 YES NO NO YES YES NO 
Technology 4520 YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Telecom 5010 YES NO YES NO NO NO 
        Notes: "Yes" means the residuals are normally distributed, while "NO" means the residuals are not 
normally distributed.    
      
     
Table 4 shows that after excluding the outliers, the normality of the distributions  greatly 
improves.  Among the 102 distributions, 63 are normal distributed, which is 62 percent, recalling 
that without excluding the outliers, only 42 percent are normal distributed. Most important, 
within the five years, all GICS groups have some years with normal distributed residual. So, in 
the following test, I will use the residuals from the samples excluding the outliers.  
 
4.6 Model  
In this study, I hypothesize that discretionary accruals prior to the issuing year (t-1) and in the 
issuing year (t) are positively correlated with new equity offerings in year t.  The following 
model is used to test whether there is a positive correlation between discretionary accruals (in 
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year t-1 ,  t,  or both year t-1 and t) and new equity offerings. The residuals estimated from 
Performance-adjusted modified Jones model are used as the dependent variables. This study 
controls for firm size measured by total assets, leverage, and market to book ratio. The 
independent variable is new equity offerings during the year.         
 
= +   +  + +  +  
                   +     
 
Where: 
 = discretionary accruals for firm i in year  t-1 or t; 
 = natural log of total assets for firm i in year  t-1 or t; 
 = total liabilities to total assets for firm i in year  t-1 or t; 
 = market to book ratio for firm i in year  t-1 or t; 
 = return on assets for firm i  in year t-1 or t; 
 = dummy variable (1 = new equity issuing during the year, 0  = none); 
 = error term 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Multivariate regression analysis 
 
Prior literature indicates that managers manipulate earnings upwards via discretionary accruals 
prior to new equity issuing in order to inflate stock price for managerial opportunism or 
rationally respond to capital market expectations (Teoh et al, 1998 and Rangan, 1998; 
Lakshmanan, 2000). I hypothesize that there is a positive correlation between earnings 
management in the year prior to and the year of new equity offerings. Panel A in Table 5 
presents the multivariate analysis of the effects of equity offerings on discretionary accruals prior 
to the issuing year for each industry group.  
 
Table 5:   Regression analysis of the effect of new public equity issuing 
Panel A: The effect of equity offerings in  
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
0.04 -0.241 -0.001 -0.011 0.016 0 -0.181 -0.095 
0.799 ***0.003 0.989 0.777 0.702 0.998 0.163 0.581 
logTA 
-0.003 0.012 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.008 0.007 
0.764 ***0.005 0.523 0.436 0.633 0.723 0.298 0.407 
Leverage 
-0.023 -0.008 -0.064 -0.027 0 -0.006 0.002 -0.079 
0.742 0.308 ***0.001 *0.051 0.999 0.863 0.684 0.133 
MTB 
0 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
0.957 **0.024 ***0.000 ***0.000 *0.059 ***0.000 **0.022 ***0.001 
ROA 
0.003 -0.065 -0.112 -0.027 0.019 -0.003 -0.098 -0.066 
0.962 **0.023 ***0.000 0.131 0.543 0.922 ***0.000 0.261 
Newissue 
0.024 0.019 0.026 -0.003 0.025 0.047 0.094 0.005 
0.422 0.311 ***0.010 0.760 **0.022 **0.024 ***0.000 0.916 
Adjusted 
R
2
 -0.013 0.018 0.07 0.025 0.021 0.051 0.092 0.072 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
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From pane A of table 5, I only find the evidence of positive correlation between new equity 
offerings and prior issuing year’s discretionary accruals in industrials, consumer staples, health 
care and IT. The coefficients for industrials and IT are .026 and .094 respectively which are 
significant at 1% level, while the coefficients for consumer staples and health care are .025 
and .047 respectively which are significant at 5% level. The coefficients for industrials , IT, 
consumer staples and health care are not only statistically significant, but also significant from 
economic aspects. All of the coefficients are more than 2%, while the coefficients  for IT are 
more than 9%, meaning that discretional accruals are managed upward for than 9% before SOEs. 
In summary, the results indicate that firms in industry, consumer staples, health care and IT are 
more likely to adopt income-increasing strategies prior to equity offerings.   
 
Following previous studies that managers continuously manipulate earnings in the year of new 
equity offerings (Teoh et al, 1998 and Rangan, 1998; Lakshmanan, 2000), I hypothesize that 
there is a positive correlation between earnings management in the year of equity offerings and 
new public issuing. Panel B in Table 5 reports the results for the effect of new equity issuing in 
the issuing year’s discretionary accruals.  
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Table 5:   Regression analysis of the effect of new public equity issuing 
Panel B:  The effects of equity offerings in  
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care 
IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
0.242 -0.142 -0.020 -0.022 0.041 -0.071 -0.081 -0.139 
0.150 *0.058 0.654 0.521 0.326 0.431 0.503 0.392 
logTA 
-0.013 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.010 
0.150 0.118 0.464 0.196 0.469 0.615 0.656 0.260 
Leverage 
-0.034 -0.011 -0.035 -0.044 -0.029 -0.010 -0.001 -0.083 
0.643 0.171 **0.043 ***0.000 0.238 0.719 0.685 0.116 
MTB 
0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
0.233 **0.045 ***0.000 ***0.000 0.140 ***0.000 **0.022 ***0.001 
ROA 
0.101 -0.067 -0.083 -0.024 0.015 -0.024 -0.077 -0.055 
**0.026 **0.014 ***0.000 0.127 0.579 0.293 ***0.000 0.346 
Newissue 
0.037 0.047 0.030 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.054 
0.273 ***0.009 ***0.001 **0.019 ***0.066 0.327 0.306 0.213 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
0.010 0.026 0.053 0.043 0.026 0.037 0.041 0.074 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
 
Panel B of table 5 shows that firms in materials and industrials indicate a significantly positive 
association at 1% level between new equity offerings and discretionary accruals during the 
issuing year. The association for firms in consumer discretionary and staples are significant at 
5% and 10% respectively.   In economic aspect, earnings management in the year of  equity 
offerings  is lower than that before the year of equity offerings, since except consumer staples, all 
of  the other three regression coefficients (materials, industrials and consumer discretional ) are 
less than 2% ( for industrials, it is only 0.1%).  The results indicate the degree of correlation 
between earnings management and new equity offerings is different across various industry 
groups.  
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Panel A and B of table 5  demonstrate  that some industries manage their earnings in the  prior 
year of new equity offerings, for example, industrials, consumer staple, health care and IT, while 
other industries manage  their earnings in the year of new equity offerings, for example,  
materials, industrials, consumer staple and consumer discretionary. For industrials and consumer 
staples, they manage their earnings in both prior and current years of new equity offering. Not 
surprisingly, firms management their earnings significantly from both statistic and economic 
aspects in the prior year of new equity issuing, since this will give a good picture of their 
financial statements in the year prior to the new equity issuing. From the economic aspect,  
earnings management in the year of new equity issue is relative smaller (less than 2%)  than 
earnings management prior to the year of new equity issue (less than 2% and as high as 9% for 
IT).   For industries which management their earnings only in the year of new equity issue but 
not in the prior year of new equity issue might because these industries have more firms which 
issue the new equity at the end of financial year, for example, the 4
th
 quarter, so that they manage 
their earning in the current year to have high earnings reported in  the prior quarters or mid- year 
financial statements.  
 
To investigate the aggregate earnings management prior and in the year of net equity offerings, I 
regress discretional accrual in year t-1 and t on NEWISSUE. Results are provided in Panel c of 
table 1. 
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Table 5:   Regression analysis of the effect of new public equity issuing 
Panel C: The effects of equity offerings in  and  
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
-0.072 -0.348 -0.031 -0.052 -0.007 0.027 -0.139 0.045 
0.664 ***0.000 0.509 0.176 0.887 0.809 0.307 0.822 
logTA 
0.002 0.018 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.004 0.001 
0.815 ***0.000 0.319 *0.077 0.849 0.506 0.608 0.890 
Leverage 
-0.012 -0.044 -0.065 -0.034 0.006 0.001 0.033 -0.076 
0.869 **0.019 ***0.001 0.015 0.816 0.975 0.070 0.159 
MTB 
0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
0.863 ***0.002 ***0.000 ***0.000 0.069 ***0.000 ***0.002 ***0.007 
ROA 
-0.007 -0.135 -0.095 -0.011 0.029 -0.007 -0.072 -0.018 
0.896 ***0.000 ***0.001 0.550 0.407 0.797 ***0.002 0.772 
Newissue 
0.031 0.032 0.044 0.013 0.035 0.039 0.087 -0.033 
0.339 *0.093 ***0.000 0.134 ***0.001 *0.07 ***0.000 0.533 
Adjusted 
R
2
 -0.016 0.074 0.082 0.034 0.048 0.051 0.110 0.061 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
 
 
Panel C shows that firms in materials, industrials , consumer staples, health care, and IT manage 
their earnings upward  prior and in the year of  new equity offerings. The earnings management 
is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant, all of them are more than 
3%, while the coefficient for IT is as high as 8%. 
 
Additionally, it is interesting to find that the market to book ratio is significantly negatively 
correlated with discretionary accruals, nearly for every industry group except for energy in the 
year prior to equity offerings and energy and consumer staples in the year of equity offerings, 
and except for health care which indicates a positive correlation. Furthermore, the association 
between ROA and discretionary accruals is also significantly positive for most of industry 
groups, which is consistent with  Kothari et al (2005)’s argument that including ROA can control 
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for heteroscedasticity not alleviated by using assets as deflator and mitigates problem of an 
omitted size variable, both of which make power of test comparisons more robust.  Other 
correlations are not common across various industries.   
 
5.2 Sensitivity tests  
 
I conduct two sensitivity tests in this study. I first split the sample at the median firm size and re-
run the regression within these subsamples. I then re-estimate regression excluding loss firms. 
The results are presented  in the following tables. 
 
5.2.1   Sensitivity tests based on firm size 
 
 Table 6 presents the sensitivity tests on larger and smaller firms’ discretionary accruals for the 
years prior to new equity offerings. The results show a different pattern for larger and smaller 
firms, specifically, for larger firms, there is a positive correlation between prior issuing year’s 
earnings management and new public offerings in Energy, Consumer Discretionary, health care 
and IT (Panel A of Table 6); for smaller firms, there is a positive correlation between prior 
issuing year’s earnings management and new public offerings in Industrials, Consumer Staples, 
and IT (Panel B of Table 6).  
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Table 6: Sensitivity tests based on firm size in year prior to equity issuing 
Panel A: The effect of equity offerings in  for large firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
-0.523 -0.221 -0.116 -0.02 0.129 0.307 -0.297 -0.163 
**0.011 **0.015 0.169 0.744 *0.066 **0.027 0.183 0.501 
logTA 
0.027 0.012 0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.019 0.013 0.008 
**0.013 **0.014 *0.094 0.58 *0.101 **0.011 0.288 0.545 
Leverage 
-0.125 -0.055 -0.05 -0.027 0.018 0.079 0.094 0.081 
0.201 0.138 0.241 0.188 0.712 *0.109 *0.070 0.376 
MTB 
0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.011 0.002 -0.005 -0.013 
0.933 **0.056 *0.066 ***0.000 ***0.003 ***0.001 0.206 0.332 
ROA 
0.014 -0.059 -0.138 0.202 0.076 0.048 -0.135 0.032 
0.883 *0.106 0.148 ***0.000 0.456 0.345 **0.026 0.854 
Newissue 
0.06 0.014 0.013 0.028 0.01 0.052 0.064 -0.088 
*0.092 0.499 0.326 **0.028 0.484 **0.045 *0.039 0.167 
Adjusted 
R
2
 0.026 0.016 0.027 0.135 0.086 0.087 0.093 0.01 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
Panel B: The effects of equity offerings in  for small firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
1.642 -1.114 0.148 0.037 -0.114 0.235 0.09 0.159 
***0.004 *0.053 0.312 0.753 0.44 0.517 0.79 0.846 
logTA 
-0.097 0.069 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.018 -0.009 -0.006 
***0.004 *0.072 0.414 0.883 0.483 0.412 0.658 0.901 
Leverage 
0.051 0.002 -0.069 -0.031 0.002 -0.05 0 -0.132 
0.602 0.866 ***0.003 0.101 0.938 0.305 0.981 *0.098 
MTB 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 
0.875 0.11 ***0.002 **0.016 0.307 ***0.000 *0.057 ***0.004 
ROA 
0.127 -0.089 -0.092 -0.045 0.012 0.011 -0.077 -0.054 
0.107 0.152 ***0.001 *0.065 0.759 0.774 ***0.008 0.496 
Newissue 
-0.02 0.061 0.035 -0.02 0.034 0.05 0.102 0.043 
0.663 0.343 **0.021 0.15 **0.036 0.123 ***0.004 0.545 
Adjusted 
R
2
 0.026 0.028 0.085 0.022 0.01 0.084 0.086 0.115 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +    
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Table 7 reports the sensitivity tests in the year of new equity offerings.  The results reveal that 
the significant positive correlation between earnings management and new equity offerings is 
found in larger firms materials and industrials at the 1% level, IT at the 5% level  and Energy at 
10% level (Panel A of Table7).  
Panel B in Table 7 shows that earnings management is positively correlated with new equity 
offerings in smaller firms in consumer discretionary, health care and telecom. Consistent with 
previous findings, there is a negative correlation between earnings management and market to 
book ratio across various industries, except for health care which indicates a significant positive 
correlation.  
 
Table 7:  Sensitivity tests on firm size in the year of equity issuing 
Panel A:  The effect of equity offerings in  for large firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
-0.065 -0.157 -0.152 -0.027 0.137 0.22 -0.181 -0.065 
0.808 *0.055 **0.041 0.628 **0.040 *0.063 0.356 0.772 
logTA 
0.004 0.007 0.009 0.003 -0.006 -0.013 0.007 0.004 
0.798 *0.085 **0.021 0.26 *0.072 **0.040 0.515 0.753 
Leverage 
-0.238 -0.037 -0.039 -0.043 0 0.062 0.084 0.032 
*0.061 0.217 0.307 **0.020 0.997 0.156 *0.077 0.729 
MTB 
0.014 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.011 0.002 -0.005 -0.007 
*0.092 *0.059 ***0.007 ***0.000 ***0.002 ***0.001 0.14 0.611 
ROA 
0.265 -0.017 -0.119 0.084 0.131 -0.001 -0.139 0.172 
**0.036 0.614 0.135 ***0.004 0.185 0.991 ***0.014 0.268 
Newissue 
0.086 0.049 0.038 -0.012 0.021 0.002 0.054 -0.042 
*0.058 ***0.007 ***0.001 0.259 0.168 0.924 **0.039 0.46 
Adjusted 
R
2
 0.058 0.021 0.071 0.11 0.101 0.051 0.083 -0.029 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
 
 
２６ 
 
Panel B: The effects of equity offerings in  for small firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
1.641 -1.009 0.188 -0.005 -0.084 0.232 0.252 -0.469 
***0.004 *0.113 0.182 0.963 0.572 0.467 0.428 0.548 
logTA 
-0.097 0.064 -0.01 0.001 0.005 -0.019 -0.017 0.03 
***0.005 *0.133 0.212 0.868 0.534 0.341 0.392 0.521 
Leverage 
0.028 -0.004 -0.036 -0.048 -0.03 -0.038 -0.002 -0.103 
0.752 0.774 *0.101 ***0.007 0.365 0.339 0.378 0.18 
MTB 
0 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 
0.992 0.184 **0.021 ***0.001 0.528 ***0.000 *0.074 ***0.004 
ROA 
0.132 -0.136 -0.058 -0.032 0.002 -0.001 -0.062 -0.058 
**0.020 **0.046 **0.030 0.15 0.96 0.981 ***0.011 0.476 
Newissue 
-0.007 0.049 0.023 0.041 0.023 0.044 -0.011 0.116 
0.895 0.487 0.125 ***0.002 0.179 *0.108 0.747 *0.097 
Adjusted 
R
2
 0.027 0.038 0.04 0.052 -0.003 0.085 0.032 0.141 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
 
Table 8 reports the sensitivity tests prior and in the year of new equity offerings.  The results 
(Panel A) reveal that the significant positive correlation between earnings management and new 
equity offerings is found in larger firms in industrials and IT  with coefficients of 0.034 and 
0.091, both are significant from statistic and economic aspects.  Panel B in Table 8 shows that 
earnings management is positively correlated with new equity offerings in smaller firms in 4  
( industrials, consumer staples, health care and IT) out of the 7  industries . Recall that for large 
firms, only 2 (industrials and IT) out of the 7 industries manage their earnings in SEO.  Except 
for IT industry, small firms manage their earnings more (5.6% for industrials and consumer 
staples, 9.3% for health care and 7.1% for IT ) more  upward than  large firms.  Choi and Sohn 
(2010) find that banks with higher disclosure levels tend to do less discretionary accounting 
practices in loan loss provisions. I suspect that the large firms manage their earnings less than 
small firms might be due to the fact the large firms usually have higher disclosure levels.  
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Table 8:  Sensitivity tests on firm size in the prior year and year of new equity issuing 
Panel A:  The effect of equity offerings in for large firms 
Industry   Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept   -0.402 -0.346 -0.165 -0.057 0.113 0.338 -0.211 -0.275 
  
**0.04 ***0.000 **0.060 0.358 0.132 **0.016 0.367 0.284 
logTA 
 
0.021 0.019 0.009 0.004 -0.005 -0.021 0.008 0.015 
  
**0.05 ***0.000 **0.029 0.242 0.202 ***0.006 0.548 0.276 
Leverage 
 
-0.075 -0.099 -0.066 -0.038 0.005 0.07 0.06 0.076 
  
0.453 ***0.012 0.142 **0.079 0.922 0.19 0.283 0.402 
MTB 
 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.01 0.001 -0.005 -0.024 
  
0.929 **0.07 **0.08 ***0.000 ***0.005 ***0.001 0.204 0.115 
ROA 
 
-0.029 -0.183 -0.144 0.225 0.031 0.056 -0.097 0.01 
  
0.771 ***0.000 0.152 ***0.000 0.777 0.291 0.113 0.954 
Newissue 
 
0.003 0.028 0.034 0.01 0.018 0.035 0.091 -0.08 
  
0.928 0.163 ***0.004 0.332 0.17 0.134 ***0.001 0.149 
Adjusted 
 R2 -0.007 0.072 0.057 0.139 0.093 0.078 0.102 0.067 
 
Panel B:  The effect of equity offerings in  for small  firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
1.51 -1.387 0.103 -0.236 -0.176 0.204 0.022 -0.319 
**0.016 *0.088 0.483 *0.066 0.278 0.625 0.949 0.704 
logTA 
-0.096 0.089 -0.005 0.014 0.008 -0.019 -0.006 0.025 
***0.010 *0.097 0.528 0.053 0.375 0.459 0.803 0.619 
Leverage 
0.081 -0.027 -0.068 -0.034 0.015 -0.045 0.03 -0.095 
0.469 0.357 ***0.004 *0.083 0.641 0.413 0.178 0.24 
MTB 
-0.001 -0.015 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
0.919 ***0.006 ***0.006 **0.014 0.355 ***0.000 ***0.009 **0.024 
ROA 
0.126 -0.136 -0.065 -0.045 0.035 0.041 -0.065 0.002 
0.128 0.083 **0.049 *0.08 0.448 0.377 0.033 0.981 
Newissue 
0.08 0.023 0.056 0.015 0.056 0.093 0.071 0.021 
0.206 0.765 ***0.000 0.251 ***0.002 **0.022 *0.061 0.837 
Adjusted 
 R2 0.039 0.174 0.091 0.031 0.073 0.114 0.091 0.126 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
 (2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
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5.2.2   Sensitivity tests for profit firms 
 
Panel A in Table 9 shows that after excluding loss firms, firms  in industrials , health care  and IT 
manage their earnings upward in the year prior to new equity issuing while firms in materials, 
industrials and consumer discretionary manage their earnings upward in the year of new equity 
issuing (Panel B, Table 9).  To test whether profit firms are more likely to manage their earnings 
in SEO, I estimate the aggregate effect of earnings management prior and in the year of new 
equity offering (Panel C, Table 9). Compared with Panel C of Table 5, which shows earnings 
management prior and in the year of new equity offerings for both profit and loss firms, Panel C 
of  Table 9 shows that on average, profit firms manage earnings more upward than loss firms, for 
example, for profit firms, materials industry manage their earnings upward by 6.1% , while for 
the unrestricted sample, materials industry only  manage their earnings upward by 3.2%.  The 
reason that profit firms manage earnings more upward might be that they have more sales, so 
that they can use the discretional accruals to manage their earnings.  
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Table 9:  Sensitivity tests excluding loss firms 
Panel A: The effects of equity offerings in on profit firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept -0.314 -0.280 -0.016 -0.066 -0.005 0.151 -0.211 0.109 
 
0.120 ***0.011 0.766 *0.095 0.916 0.274 0.322 0.642 
logTA 0.019 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.011 -0.013 
 
*0.081 ***0.001 0.884 ***0.009 0.875 0.336 0.352 0.282 
Leverage -0.152 -0.119 0.038 -0.039 0.023 -0.122 0.003 0.334 
 
0.224 **0.024 0.248 **0.028 0.622 0.180 0.968 0.162 
MTB -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 -0.013 0.004 -0.004 0.000 
 
0.486 0.230 ***0.001 ***0.000 ***0.001 0.250 0.484 0.983 
ROA -0.058 -0.358 0.024 -0.100 0.009 -0.189 -0.345 0.198 
 
0.728 ***0.000 0.741 **0.048 0.952 0.222 **0.020 0.491 
Newissue 0.030 0.029 0.024 0.009 0.015 0.057 0.102 -0.152 
 
0.460 0.295 **0.037 0.405 0.269 *0.057 ***0.006 **0.047 
Adjusted 
R2 0.002 0.108 0.030 0.062 0.092 0.024 0.101 0.071 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10%           
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +  
Panel B: The effects of equity offerings in  on profit firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept -0.309 -0.339 -0.019 -0.070 0.002 0.161 -0.092 -0.125 
 
0.120 ***0.002 0.732 *0.074 0.958 0.250 0.662 0.638 
logTA 0.018 0.020 -0.001 0.005 0.000 -0.007 0.004 -0.003 
 
*0.083 ***0.000 0.771 ***0.009 0.988 0.347 0.722 0.779 
Leverage -0.146 -0.109 0.049 -0.035 0.029 -0.090 0.029 0.349 
 
0.245 **0.036 0.125 *0.048 0.528 0.326 0.692 0.257 
MTB -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.004 -0.014 0.003 -0.004 0.000 
 
0.477 0.338 ***0.001 ***0.000 ***0.001 0.408 0.520 0.996 
ROA -0.059 -0.351 0.039 -0.096 0.033 -0.200 -0.351 0.128 
 
0.722 ***0.000 0.588 *0.058 0.818 0.202 **0.021 0.712 
Newissue 0.032 0.076 0.036 0.024 0.012 -0.031 0.052 -0.011 
 
0.434 ***0.005 ***0.001 **0.021 0.380 0.368 0.150 0.917 
Adjusted 
R2 0.002 0.134 0.042 0.071 0.089 0.002 0.073 -0.041 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10%           
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +  
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Panel C: The effects of equity offerings in  on profit firms 
Industry Energy Materials Industrials 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Health 
Care IT  Telecom 
Intercept 
-0.355 -0.341 -0.036 -0.069 -0.021 0.174 -0.215 0.048 
*0.087 ***0.002 0.507 *0.081 0.665 0.211 0.306 0.878 
logTA 
0.02 0.02 0 0.005 0.001 -0.009 0.01 -0.009 
*0.063 ***0.000 0.957 ***0.009 0.767 0.264 0.378 0.497 
Leverage 
-0.148 -0.117 0.031 -0.037 0.026 -0.117 -0.002 0.3 
0.236 **0.025 0.328 **0.037 0.56 0.204 0.982 0.251 
MTB 
-0.008 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.014 0.005 -0.003 0.002 
0.505 0.177 ***0.001 ***0.000 ***0.001 0.238 0.621 0.889 
ROA 
-0.043 -0.346 0.033 -0.098 0.05 -0.2 -0.338 0.082 
0.796 ***0.0002 0.643 *0.055 0.725 0.201 **0.022 0.79 
Newissue 
0.041 0.061 0.042 0.012 0.024 0.033 0.102 -0.073 
0.281 **0.013 ***0.000 0.19 **0.030 0.216 ***0.001 0.415 
Adjusted 
R2 0.007 0.128 0.056 0.064 0.115 0.008 0.115 -0.022 
Note: (1) ***Significance at 1%, **5%, *10% 
(2) = +   +  + +  +  +     
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, I examine whether Australian firms manage earnings a year before they issue new 
shares to the public and also during the year of share offering. The underlying assumption is that 
firms will manage their earning upwards as this will reflect well on their operations. This will in 
turn induce the share market to value their shares higher than it actually is. I document the pool 
results of our examination. In addition, I partition firms into large and small firms using the 
median firm size as the divider. Moreover, I also re-run the regression by omitting loss firms.  
 
I find that consistent with my initial proposition, firms do manage their earnings one year before 
and during the year of share issuing. I find in the pooled sample, there is a significant 
relationship between earnings management and new share issuing in the year of issuance for 
firms in the Materials, Industry, Consumer discretionary and Consumer staples industry. For the 
one year before share issuance I find that there is a positive association between the prior year 
earnings management and current year share issue. I partition the firms into large and small firms 
on the median firm size level. I find that for large firms there is a significant association between 
prior year earnings management and share issuing in firms from the Health care and IT industry. 
Similar conclusions are drawn for small firms in the Consumer discretionary industry.  
 
I also document that profit firms manage their earnings in the year prior to share issuing, but on 
average, they do not manage earnings in the year of share issuance. 
 
This study can be extended in various directions. First, using Australian data, I can test whether 
post share issuing performance declines to reflect an adjustment for the earnings management. 
３２ 
 
Doing so will provide further evidence that firms do manage earnings around the time leading up 
to and including the time of seasoned equity offerings. In addition, I could study why profitable 
firms on average appear to manage earnings only in the year prior to share offerings and not in 
the year of offerings. In the same vein, I could also investigate loss firms’ earnings management 
behaviour more. Some interesting questions to be answered relating to them, relates to the year 
where they eventually make a profit. Is this related to earnings management or is this related to 
real policy choices. In addition, a study can further run the regression biannually using interim 
reports. Such a study will improve our understanding of how earnings management behaves 
closer to equity offerings. 
 
 
３３ 
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